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Abstract 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The main focus of this study is to measure the effectiveness of corporate governance in private firms 
as within five thematic areas: Whether Corporate Governance would bring about the desired level of 
fairness, transparency and accountability in companies(Desired Level), whether Board of Directors 
prepare analyses and assessments of the quality and efficiency of its activities (Board assessment), 
whether there is establish communications structure(communication), wherther there are weaknesses 
in internal control mechanisms(weaknesses) and whether company reward learning and 
development(Learning). We used survey questionnaires adopted from ARGE model to solicit 
responses from board members and top management of 40 selected private firms in Ghana. We 
employed multinomial multiple regression to estimate the importance of these thematic areas in 
positively influencing corporate governance, holding the other variables constant. We asses our 
model and find that our model is appropriate to carry on the regression analysis. From the analysis, 
we found that all the variables have impacts on the predictors with a statistically significant value 
with the exception of communication which was not statistically significant.  We also found out that 
weakness and learning highly relate to the outcome with higher odd ratio and are more significant.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate boards have a fiduciary relationship with 
the stakeholders of a firm especially the shareholders. 
They are therefore ultimately responsible for the 
performance of the firm. Corporate governance 
enhances practices and procedures to ensure that a 
company is managed in a way that it attains its 
objectives.  Governance is all about leadership.  The 
purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate 
effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management 
that can lead to the long-term success of the company 
Financial Reporting Council (2012). Ghana’s 
corporate sector is important to the producer,  
 
 
 
consumer, employer, and the taxpayer in the national 
economy. Therefore, a crisis of corporate governance  
in Ghana would adversely impact the health and 
growth of the domestic economy on a number of 
fronts (Gyasi & Evans, 2010). A company is a legal 
person controlled by boards of directors in the 
interest of shareholders. Sometimes the interest of 
both groups could be divergent, a central theme 
common in all the regulations across different 
jurisdictions is the recognition of the need to embrace 
a value system potential for a holistic achievement of 
societal goals. A corporation with poor corporate 
governance strategies can have a negative influence 
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on the business market and the larger economy. This 
was seen during the economic crisis of 2009 when 
poor corporate decisions led to cascading failures in 
the real estate and automobile markets, which in turn 
caused large-scale job layoffs and economic slowing 
(Jonathan, 2017).  
Corporate governance developments in Ghana is no 
exception with the introduction of the 2002 Code of 
best practices by SEC; as well as many other 
guidelines by all other agencies.  The legal rule that 
governs entities using the corporate method in Ghana 
is the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179); The 
challenge of good corporate governance is to find a 
way in which the interest of the shareholders, 
directors and other stakeholders can be sufficiently 
satisfied. Several concepts apply to sound corporate 
governance some common ones include efficiency, 
probity, responsibility, transparency and 
accountability(CACG Guidelines 1999, 2011). 
Robust though these guidelines are, they are not 
without limitations. 
There has been a general, sometimes intense, debate 
on whether public companies should be privatised  
due to failures of most public firms in Ghana with 
respect to inefficient board, Zhong (2015) researched 
on corporate governance of Chinese private firms 
and found out that privatised firms provide better 
performance by robustly setting up a board of 
directors and providing the CEO with the company 
share. Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2016) found out 
that privatization raises measures of profitability, 
productivity, and growth. On the other hand, it is also 
suggested that privatisation has its own problems 
thereby the collapsing of most recent private firms 
and banks. Adams (2011) provided a poll of support 
for privatisation policy in Ghana. In the poll, 66 
percent of respondents support the government's 
privatisation efforts while 69 percent of respondents 
do not support the government's privatisation efforts. 
The author suggested that it could be the result of 
recent objections against privatisation. It is against 
this debate that this paper attempt to find out if 
corporate governance is being effectively 
administered in private firms in Ghana and whether it 
has a role to play in the collapsing of these firms. It 
also brings out some recommendations that can help 
improve corporate governance practice in Ghana. 
Section 2 covers `prevailing condition in private 
firms and literature review Section 3 Methodology, 
section 4 findings and analysis and Section 5 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2.1 Conditions of Private Firms in Ghana 
The corporate governance developments and 
disclosures in any country are often shaped by a wide 
array of internal as well as external factors (Okike, 
2007). Accordingly, the internal factors include 
inadequate management, organizational inertia and 
confusion, lack of financial control, poor working 
capital management, relatively high cost structure, 
lack of marking efforts, big projects/acquisitions, 
inappropriate financial policies and overtrading while 
the external factors include strong competition, 
changes in market demand and adverse movements 
in external costs(Coopers, 2006).  Public ownership 
is associated with inefficiency due to non-financial 
motivations (Potter, 2015). Like Publicly-run 
companies, private companies have its own problems 
especially within markets where the suppliers have 
so much power over price (such as those of the 
necessary goods like water and electricity). One 
common mistake of proponents of privatization is to 
use the success of private companies in western 
countries to extrapolate its potential success in Ghana 
(Gyasi & Evans, 2010). Some failures in 
privatisation include privatisation of utilities in 
Ghana which has been less successful if not a 
complete failure, in particular in the case of water 
privatisation. Observers disagree on who is to blame 
for the failure, although the root cause is the lack of 
investment in infrastructure according to most 
sources (Hooker, 2008). From between July 2005 to 
October 2018 there have been 9 companies delisted 
from the Ghana stock exchange. Some authors blame 
reasons for these de-listings on weak boards stating 
that in Ghana, the issue of lack of capacity or 
incompetence of boards to enforce good corporate 
governance practice cuts across public and private 
sector enterprise(Amos, 2018).  Also, Wen, Quacoe, 
Dodor, Quacoe, and Bediako (2017) finds that SMEs 
that got listed in China and US performed poorly 
after IPO. Many companies in Ghana especially the 
private sector continue to operate as sole 
proprietorships. Shareholder accountability and 
minority-protection systems in most companies 
appear to exist only on paper, leaving room for much 
self-dealing by corporate management and insider at 
the same time the private company option, has grown 
in popularity among Ghana’s entrepreneurs and 
businesses (Prempeh, 2002). There are situations in 
which a company’s assets and obligations are not 
clearly separated from the owners of the company. 
Incidentally, that is the case with many private 
companies in Ghana (Prempeh, 2002).  
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Good corporate governance, from an academic 
perspective, is about aligning the interests of 
shareholders and management. When the interests of 
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shareholders and management diverge it creates the 
so-called ‘agency problem. Good corporate 
governance means management and shareholders are 
on the same page – maximization of firm value over 
the long-term, Companies scored on 17 research-
backed measures and the scores are used to create the 
index. These measures fall under four broad 
categories: ownership structure, boards of directors, 
independence, remuneration. These broad categories 
and measures have been shown to be very good 
indicators of good corporate governance (Auckland 
University of Technology, 2017), Some authors 
believe that corporate social responsibility is an 
important regulator of corporate governance. Good 
corporate governance however as stated by Tuncer 
(2004) is a stakeholder-oriented policy that allocates 
responsibilities to societal actors and that will drive 
corporate accountability” he further identified the 
elements of good corporate governance as 
“stakeholder empowered corporate governance; 
management and performance evaluation systems; 
transparency enhancement; accountability 
verification”. Good corporate governance lies in 
entrepreneurial democracy, which systematically 
questions the organization’s mission and its relation 
to the common good (Aras & Crowther, 2010).  
There are three empirical ways of measuring the 
performance of a system of corporate governance as 
suggested by Macey (1997): by determining the level 
of control exerted by shareholders compared to their 
participation; by measuring the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to make initial public offerings of 
stock; by analysing the functioning of internal and 
external markets from a corporate control point of 
view. According to Jain and Christine Jiang & 
Mohamed Mekhaimer (2016)firms with better 
internal governance have lower information 
asymmetry and higher liquidity. Most of the attention 
in terms of corporate governance was geared towards 
making predictions about the performance of 
organizations as a result of the choice of corporate 
governance practices (Starks, 2003) or associating 
costs to some corporate governance mechanisms 
McKnight and Weir (2009),Volpin (2002) and 
Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi (2003) argue that poor 
governance is implied by a lower sensitivity of 
turnover performance when controlling shareholders 
and also top executives. An in-depth analysis of two 
major privatisations in Ghana and report that the 
performance of firms substantially improves after 
privatisation as performed by (Tsamenyi, 2010). He 
also reports that the privatisation and subsequent 
improvements in performance were accompanied by 
changes in accounting and control systems. One way 
to achieve such good performance is through 
competitive compensation of employees (Quacoe, 
Wen, Quacoe, & Dodor, 2018). 
A lot tries to measure the quality of corporate 
governance and they focus on compliance-related 
issues. Most rating models also seem to focus on the 
inputs of governance, such as the composition of 
boards and the separation of the CEO and chairman 
roles. Sufficient attention, however, is not paid to the 
quality of information, decision-making processes, 
nor link the effectiveness of governance to output 
measures such as the brand image, employee and 
customer satisfaction indices, or profitability and 
value creation. Also, most measures fail to deal with 
learning and development in governance (Arguden, 
2010). To measure the effectiveness of corporate 
governance Arguden (2010) used a model called the 
ARGE. The essence of the ARGE Corporate 
Governance Model is to evaluate how craft principles 
are applied to the logic of governance. The model 
aims to incorporate not only structural aspects of 
governance but also behavioural aspects such as the 
evaluation of sufficient number of alternatives in 
decision-making, the quality of information that 
forms the basis of sound judgment, the culture of 
decision-making, the processes, and the results of 
oversight and guidance functions of the board of 
directors. The model stands on four main areas, three 
of which are inputs and the fourth output. The study 
was focus on those measures. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1Questionnaire and Sampling 
 
Data for this study was generated from administered 
questionnaires. The purposive sampling was used to 
target across sections of the respondents. After being 
informed of the objective of the study, top managers, 
board members and some employees from different 
companies in private sector were administered a 
structured questionnaire designed to collect 
information about how effective corporate 
governance is being administered in their various 
workplace.150 questionnaires were involved in all, 
after adjusting for outliers, the sample comprises 120 
respondents and 40 firms. Multinomial logistic 
regression using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows® 
Version 22.0 (IBM Corp, Armonk, NY, USA) is 
employed as a technique to estimate the model. This 
study also employed ARGE framework design. 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Assessment of the Regression Analysis 
Model for Private Sector 
We assess the appropriateness of our regression 
model in order to make a valid inference. First, we 
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check the Goodness-of-Fit test. This test indicates 
how well our regression model fits the data used in 
this analysis. The null hypothesis is that the model 
fits the data well. The rest provides two measures to 
test the fitness of the model to the data (see table 1). 
The first test, labelled "Pearson", presents the 
Pearson chi-square statistic. According to the results, 
a statistically insignificant figure of 0.990 means we 
are completely unable to reject the null hypothesis. 
This is interpreted that our regression model 
adequately fits the data used in this analysis. Similar 
to the Pearson results, the Deviance test with the null 
hypothesis of a poor fit of the model for the data, the 
results reject this hypothesis at 5% significant level. 
This also shows that the model fits the data well and 
can be used for analysis. Another important statistical 
result for model fit is the Model Fitting Information 
test presented in table 2. This test whether the 
independent variables significantly improve the 
model compared to the intercept. 
 
 
Table 2: Model Fitting Information      
 
 
Table 3: Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
The result shows a statistical significance at 5% 
which means that the full model statistically 
significantly predicts the dependent variable better 
than the intercept-only model alone. Likelihood 
Ratio Tests presented in table 3 is another important 
test. This test is useful for this study since our 
independent variables are nominal variables and this 
is the only test that considers the overall statistical 
significance value of a nominal variable. As can be 
seen, each of our independent variables is statistically 
significant at 5% significant level. This shows that 
the contribution of each variable in explaining the 
dependent variable is significant and so retains its 
statistical importance for inclusion in the model for 
interpretation.  
 
4.2 INTERPRETATION OF ANALYSIS 
 
According to table 4, for Corporate governance to 
achieve its desired level of relevance in private sector, 
attention must be given to increasing Transparency 
and Accountability (IT&Acc) as compared to 
increasing internal control exercised (IN ICE). The 
results show that all things being equal, Increasing 
Transparency and Accountability influence corporate 
governance in private firms by 2.394 times higher 
than the influence of Internal Control exercised (IN 
ICE) corporate governance. This result is significant 
at 5% confidence level. Similarly, for the board of a 
private firm to achieve its desired relevance, more 
emphasis should be placed on Increasing the 
Responsibility of the Board of Directors rather than 
Increasing the Internal Control mechanisms in the 
company (IN ICE). According to the results 
presented in table 4, Responsibility of the Board of 
Directors has an odd ratio value of 1.31. This means, 
compared Increasing the Internal Control 
mechanisms, respondents are 31% higher in 
preferring an increase in the Responsibility of the 
Board of Directors as a means of ensuring that 
corporate governance achieves its desired aim in the 
private firms, all others things being equal. This 
result is significant at 10%.  Most private firms are 
profit-oriented but this objective is often hindered by 
lack of capital. A competent board can use 
innovative strategies such as asset 
securitization(Quacoe, Banson, & Sakoe, 2015) to 
overcome the financial heddles.  Respondents were 
asked how their Board’s yearly assessments of the 
quality and efficiency of its activities contribute to 
the relevance of the board. The results show that 
holding the other variables constant, yearly 
assessments of the quality and efficiency of the board 
will strengthen Transparency and Accountability 
rather than Increasing the Internal Control 
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mechanisms by 0.59 times. In other words, a board’s 
yearly assessment of its activities can strengthen the 
internal control system by 41% higher than it 
strengthens Transparency and Accountability in 
private firms. When we compared the Internal 
Control mechanism to the Responsibility of the 
Board of Directors, we find an odds ratio of 2.539. 
This is interpreted the yearly assessment of the 
quality and efficiency of its activities influence a 
board to take higher responsibilities in the firm 
compared with how it influences the internal control 
systems in the firm. This becomes a ‘wake-up call’ 
for the board. Asked about the influence of effective 
communication on the various factors, the results 
show an odds ratio of 2.962 in favour of IT & Acc. 
against Internal Control system. This means, holding 
other variables constant when there is an effective 
communication system in a private firm, it improves 
IT &Acc. more than it does to Internal Control 
system. However, an effective communication 
system in a private firm will positively influence 
Internal Control system by 1.623 higher than it will 
influence board to be more responsible. Also, we find 
out from respondents if there are weaknesses in the 
internal control mechanisms and whether they are 
identified and remedied. It turns out that holding the 
other variables constant, regular identification and 
remedy of a firm’s weakness will increase the 
Internal Control by 8.4&4.8 times higher than it will 
increase IT & Acc. but it will cause the Board of 
Directors to be more responsible by 0.8 and 0.9 times 
higher than it will affect the Internal Control in 
private firms. This is significant at a 5% confidence 
level. This indicates that for corporate governance to 
be effective, more emphasis needs to be placed on 
increasing the internal control systems in private 
firms. Further, in this study, we find out from 
respondents how appropriate learning and 
development affect the other factors in our study. It 
turns out that, holding the other variables constant, 
learning and development will Increase the Internal 
Control by 11% higher than it will increase IT & 
Acc. but it will cause the Board of Directors to be 
more responsible by 2.3 times higher than it will 
affect Internal Control in private firms. 
 
Table 4: Multinomial logistic regression for private 
companies 
 
The reference category: Increasing the Internal 
Control exercised in the company (IN ICE) 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The main focus of this study was to measure the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in private firm 
as within five thematic areas, Whether Corporate 
Governance would bring about the desired level 
of fairness, transparency and accountability in 
companies(Desired Level),whether Board of 
Directors prepare analyses and assessments of 
the quality and efficiency of its activities (Board 
assessment), whether there is establish 
communications structure(communication), 
wherther there are weaknesses in internal control 
mechanisms(weaknesses) and whether company 
reward learning and development(Learning). We 
employed multinomial multiple regression to 
estimate the importance of each of these thematic 
areas in positively influencing corporate governance, 
holding the other variables constant. We assessed our 
model and find that our model is appropriate to carry 
on the regression analysis. From the analysis, we 
found that all the variables have an impact on the 
predictors with a statistically significant value with 
the exception of communication which was not 
statistically significant.  We also found out that 
weakness and learning highly relate to the outcome 
with a higher odds ratio and are more significant. 
From the studies, it was obvious that corporate 
governance effectiveness in Ghana’s private sector is 
weak. We therefore conclude that there is the need to 
strengthen the corporate governance system in 
private firms to prevent financial crises in the future. 
This study, therefore, recommends that stakeholders 
such as shareholders, boards and management of 
private firms need to actively involve in monitoring 
and overseeing to the effectiveness of the firms. We 
also recommend that there should be competent 
people with industrial knowledge put on board 
including family or friends. However, family and 
friends should be controlled and monitored just like 
any other unfamiliar ties will be controlled and 
monitored. We recommend that further studies be 
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conducted in the public sector for a more complete 
picture. 
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